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The Shanghai Cooperation Organi-
sation (SCO) held its 10th anniversary 
summit in Kazakhstan’s capital, 
Astana, on 15 June to celebrate its 
achievements over the last decade 
and guide its future development. 
Contrary to the negative predictions 
that it would prove to be a paper 
tiger, over the past ten years the 
SCO has developed into a full-
fledged organisation with a structure 
capable of managing its wide-
ranging cooperation on security, 
economy, transportation, disaster 
relief, law enforcement, culture, etc. 
Meanwhile, the SCO has also expanded 
various cooperative ties with interested 
non-member states in the region, as 
well as with multilateral organisations 
to help it to play an influential 
constructive role in Eurasia. Contrary 
to some western suspicions of it as a 
“NATO of the East”, there is no talk of 
transforming the SCO into an exclusive 
military alliance. As a demarche for the 
SCO in the next decade, the Astana 
Declaration consolidates security and 
economic cooperation as its priorities 
by boosting more positive engagement 
with other members of the international 
community.
Different to a traditional military 
alliance, designed to counter external 
threats, the SCO was founded in 
2001 to confront the endogenous 
security challenges from the “three 
evil forces” of terrorism, separatism 
and extremism, which cast a shadow 
over the regional stability of Central 
Asia since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In line with the organisation’s 
primary goal, the Astana summit 
sought to step up security cooperation 
by means of signing a memorandum 
of understanding with the Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation’s (CSTO) 
Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS). 
This memorandum intends to offer a 
regular basis for these two institutions 
to improve coordination of capabilities 
as well as the effectiveness of joint 
actions. Furthermore, the Astana 
summit made progress on combating 
narco-trafficking, which is closely 
related to the SCO’s Afghanistan-
focused efforts. 
Given the withdrawal of NATO’s ISAF 
mission from Afghanistan in the near 
future and marginally successful 
counter-narcotics strategies, the 
SCO is deeply concerned about the 
increasing possibility of facing a further 
deterioration of the security situation 
in its neighbourhood. To help avoid a 
negative scenario, the leaders of the 
SCO member-states not only approved 
a joint counter-narcotics strategy for 
the next five years, including an action 
plan, but also signed a memorandum 
of understanding between the SCO 
Secretariat and the UN Office on 
Drugs and Crime to stop the spread 
of drugs from Afghanistan and cut 
off the financial resources of local 
terrorist and extremist groups. Instead 
of taking unilateral action to get its 
teeth into the security field, the SCO 
has shown an obvious preference 
to integrate its own efforts into a 
broader multilateral framework both 
on a regional and a global level. It is 
reasonable to predict that the SCO 
will take on more responsibility for the 
Afghan reconstruction process and 
actively cooperate with other donors. 
Meanwhile the Afghan government 
submitted its application for observer 
status to the SCO which will be helpful 
in this respect.
The Astana summit also provided 
clarity over the SCO expansion issue. 
The SCO has been tagged as an 
anti-Western bloc since 2005 when 
it called for the removal of the U.S. 
airbase in Uzbekistan, and rejected the 
U.S. request to observe its summit in 
Astana that year. At the same time, it 
granted permission for India, Pakistan 
and Iran to join the SCO as observer 
states, arousing further suspicion that 
the organisation was created as an 
anti-American card. These kind of 
prejudicial perspectives on the SCO 
were to some extent attributed to the 
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lack of a specific and practical criterion 
for choosing its new members. Taking 
this into consideration, the SCO 
approved the first special regulations 
on the admission of new members, 
offering a legal basis for its expansion 
last year. To advance the expansion 
process, the Astana summit signed a 
new memorandum on the obligations 
for a candidate country on the basis of 
the previous regulations. According to 
these two documents, it is impossible 
for the SCO to grant full membership 
to Iran unless the UN suspends or lifts 
its sanctions related to Iranian nuclear 
plans. The SCO has shown its colours 
with this measured attitude towards 
its expansion. It indicates clearly 
that this organisation stands with the 
international community on the issue of 
non-proliferation instead of weakening 
the authority of the UN’s resolutions. 
It has thus become increasingly 
apparent that this group does not seek 
isolation but instead is willing to foster 
cooperation with other multilateral 
organisations such as ASEAN, the 
CSTO, the CIS, EurAsEC and the UN. 
However, to date the SCO has only 
developed loose links with European 
organisations, with limited and indirect 
interaction chiefly taking place at EU, 
OSCE and NATO Central Asia and 
Afghanistan-themed events. None 
of the above has shown much zeal 
at the prospect of formalising their 
relationship with the SCO despite the 
fact that they often have coinciding 
interests and such cooperation would 
permit a broader Eurasian approach 
to tackling local concerns. The EU for 
example has mostly based its dialogue 
only on informal, ad hoc contact 
between SCO Secretary-Generals 
and the EU Special Representative 
for Central Asia. Critics have voiced 
concern that pursuing such a low-key 
approach risks leaving the EU on the 
sidelines and could result in missed 
opportunities to work together on 
areas of common concern such as 
drugs, water management and border 
security. 
Beyond the motives of overlapping 
economic, security and energy 
priorities, official SCO-EU dialogue – 
which could rely on the ASEAN case 
as a blueprint – would allow Brussels 
to increase its visibility and boost its 
credibility in Central Asia. There is 
reason to believe that engaging with 
the SCO on its own terms, that is to 
say, respecting the Shanghai Spirit 
(the principle of mutual trust, mutual 
benefits, equal rights and respect for 
diversity) could serve as a confidence-
building measure which would allow the 
EU to step out of its perceived role as 
a Eurocentric norm promoter. Besides, 
with no pressure to pay lip service to 
democracy, the SCO arena is likely 
to give a more realistic picture of the 
members’ intentions and expectations. 
After all, it is clear that dialoguing with 
the SCO is not tantamount to endorsing 
its members’ political systems; it will 
solely allow the EU to better grasp 
local priorities. 
All in all, it is reasonable to believe 
that the SCO will strength its ability for 
maintaining regional and global peace, 
stability and prosperity with a more 
open and transparent approach as 
mentioned in the Astana Declaration. 
Indeed, the SCO has the potential to 
become a significant security actor 
in Central Asia in the future and to 
gain a greater presence globally 
through its influential member states, 
Russia and China, plus observers 
such as India. Attaining this status 
does however depend on the ability 
of China and Russia to bridge gaps 
in diverging economic and security 
approaches and for them to avoid 
head-on competition over leadership in 
the organisation. The SCO’s regional 
security role is equally currently 
undermined by its limited budget and 
weak institutions as well as inadequate 
experience in regional integration. 
Remedying these weaknesses would 
allow the SCO to enjoy the position 
of an attractive dialogue partner for 
European organisations in Central Asia 
and thus increase its own legitimacy 
as a Eurasian organisation. A broad 
Eurasian approach is advisable given 
the landlocked nature of Central 
Asia and the overlapping priorities 
of the organisations operating there. 
Dismantling stereotypes about the 
“NATO of the East” and focusing on 
cooperation would permit all involved 
parties to avoid a duplication of effort 
and to meet their objectives more 
effectively.
